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

Works in Non-Arabic Languages

Parallel Worlds and Split-Selves: A Cognitive Stylistic Analysis of Susanna Kaysen's Mental Illness Memoir Girl, Interrupted

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***Abstract**:*

This study provides a cognitive stylistic analysis of one of the most poignant parallel worlds created in contemporary mental-illness memoirs- Susanna Kaysen's *Girl, Interrupted*. More specifically, this study involves a Text World Theory perspective on Kaysen's *Girl, interrupted* to explore the reader's cognitive interactions with the text through the analysis of the stylistic particularities of psychologically-loaded episodes in terms of the shifting between matrix text-worlds and the generated sub-worlds. This research also draws upon the "Split-self" phenomenon and the notion of "Mind-style" to highlight the way textual features and narratorial techniques cue the reader's navigation between various alternative worlds and conceptual points of view and to elucidate the blurred narrative consciousness employed in this memoir. This was demonstrated through textual analysis which suggested that being exposed to parallel worlds inhabited by alter selves is, in part, what allows the reader to experience the different aspects of the story from particular points of view filtered through idiosyncratic mind-styles.

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Cognitive Stylistics, Text World Theory, Split-self, Mind-style, Focalization

الملخص

تقدم هذه الدراسة تحليلًا أسلوبيًّا معرفيًّا لواحدة من أكثر العوالم المتوازية تأثيرًا في مجال المذكرات المعاصرة للأمراض العقلية وهي " فتاة، قُوطِعت "بقلم سوزاناكايسن. وبشكل أكثر تحديدًا، تشمل هذه الدراسة تحليلًا من منظور" نظريةالعالم النصي" (Text World Theory) لاستكشاف التفاعلات المعرفية للقارئ مع النص من خلال تحليل الخصائص الأسلوبية المعرفية للأجزاء الغنية بالعناصر النفسية من المذكرات وذلك من حيث التحول بين العوالم النصية الرئيسة وما ينبثق منها من عوالم فرعية. ويستند هذا البحث أيضًا على ظاهرة "انقسام الذات" (Split-Self) ومفهوم " الأسلوب العقلي" (Mind-Style) لتسليط الضوء على العناصر النصية والأساليب الروائية التي تنقل القارئ بين العوالم البديلة المختلفة وأوجه النظر المفاهيمية لتوضيح الوعي السردي المبهم في هذه المذكرات. وقد تم توضيح ذلك من خلال التحليل النصي الذي بين أن التعرض لعوالم موازية يسكنها أنفسًا متغيرة يتيح للقارئ معايشة جوانب مختلفة من القصة من وجهات نظر مختلفة تعد انعكاسات "لأساليب عقلية" خاصة وفردية.

Introduction

"And it is easy to slip into a parallel universe. There are so many of them: worlds of the insane, the criminal, the crippled, the dying, perhaps of the dead as well. These worlds exist alongside this world and resemble it, but are not in it."

Susanna Kaysen (1993)

The present research is part of an emerging cognitive stylistic tradition in the analysis of narratives. Working within the framework of this tradition, the present study is designed to explore the way narrative parameters give rise to the reader's shifting between dual structures of worlds, selves, and mind-styles in the course of reading Susanna Kaysen's (1993) mental illness memoir, *Girl, Interrupted*.

Text World Theory (TWT hereinafter) is an outstanding methodology for exploration of the reader's cognitive interactions with a text. Similar to the way the reader shifts from "the real world into the narrative world of a text" (McIntyre, 2006 p. 123), he is also enabled to move between the textual actual world and the alternative worlds or the "thoughts and perceptions of characters in the story-world" (Segal, 1995 p. 76). TWT thus provides an appropriate model for this study as it presents the text-driven conceptual structures that are generated in the minds of discourse participants, the writer and the reader.

In accordance also with a cognitive stylistic analysis of Kaysen's memoir, this research explores the possibilities of 'Split-Selves' in Kaysen's narrative in an endeavor to consider how the reader interprets the events of the memoir as articulated and depicted by a process of dual focalization. This is based on a typology developed by Catherine Emmott (2002), which resulted from Emmott's consideration and categorization of the various representations of "split selves" in narratives. The value of considering split-selves in the

analysis of text-worlds in narratives is that exposure to a character's particular self within a certain text-world could indicate the perspective to which the reader is being exposed.

McCrum (1998) asserts that self/world splits may allow a means of commenting on the changes in everyday circumstances (such as loss of independence and professional status, restrictions on taken for granted domestic routines, and the physical confinement of a hospital bed). In other words, the positioning of various focalizers in the various text-worlds can provide the key to determining which self is being referred to as the narrative itself may create different selves by contrasting different perspectives and different voices. Therefore, the process of mapping such cognitive notions onto each other can only serve to illustrate the complex narrative architecture of texts.

Since a cognitive approach is relevant to the study of textual world views in general, it is best approached by combining the analysis of cognitive linguistic patterns with theories of point of view. Given that the notion of 'Mind-Style' in narrative has to do with the linguistic construction of a particular conceptualization of a textual world, it is particularly appropriate for the present analysis since it could depict the inner working of each of the split-selves in the narrative and hereby signaling the particular point of view the reader is being exposed to in a certain section of the narration.

Generally speaking, this paper is an attempt to unravel the duality

of the competing discourses presented in overlapping text-worlds through a cognitive stylistic analysis. It argues that the double-vision perspective that occurs in the memoir is because of the different 'selves', and their corresponding mind-styles, as presented in the different text-worlds of the narrative. Cognitive stylistics therefore provides a useful tool in the analysis of this memoir, thereby affirming what is stated in the epigraph of Roy's (1997) *The God of Small Things*: "Never again will a single story be told as though it is only one."

Emmott (2002) explains that, because of its linguistic objectives and its unauthentic data (generally isolated made-up sentences), "classic cognitive linguistics" does not examine "particular individuals in specific contexts with specific life stories" (p.156). She adds that although cognitive linguistics may be useful in examining narratives, narrative analysis yet needs a good model of how entities are capable of change. In this respect, the present research applies cognitively-informed psychologically-driven models to the stylistic analysis of a narrative text to offer an understanding of the way the events are perceived by the readers; an approach largely overlooked by literary critics.

Emmott (2002) further states that more systematic work is needed to identify the distinction between "the everyday split-self" examples and those of the "stylistically important marked split-self". This research, in looking into references to divided/splitselves in an extended narrative, investigates how individual entities refer to themselves and discuss their own sense of identity. This research also

looks into how such splits are systematically used for the special stylistic purpose of relaying events from distinctive points of view. Lakoff (1996) reserves the term "split-self" for occasions when there are different intellectual/social aspects of the self, such as when someone speaks of their "scientific self" or their "religious self". This research adds yet another dichotomy to the categorizations of split-selves, that of the "sane self" and the "insane self".

Semino (2003) notes that despite their various advantages for cognitive stylistics, alternate world approaches do not systematically consider how worlds are constructed in the interaction between the reader's mind and linguistic expression. Additionally, Hargreaves (2012) notes, "the nature of those text worlds established from reading fiction will be strongly influenced by the style of narration" and, as a consequence, "stylistic features are central to a TWT approach" (p. 2). Generally, the present study is a systematic investigation of the linguistic construction of how Kaysen's self-expression relates to her world-view. In other words, it is an informed account of how Kaysen's use of text-worlds relates to the character's split-self, and, consequently, to mind-style and point of view in this memoir. To the best of the present researcher's knowledge, the way textual features of mental illness narrative undergo variations in terms of shifting or movement between the text actual world and alternative parallel worlds has not been investigated.

Finally, the majority of the abundant existing academic material on memoirs can be seen to be mainly concerned with the analysis of the philosophical and scientific content of the text from a purely literary critical standpoint. There are only a few notable exceptions to this rule, employing a stylistic methodology to examine the discoursal incongruities contained within the text. These analyses aside, current understanding of the stylistic mechanisms at work within memoirs remains relatively slight. The present study is intended not only as a further contribution to existing knowledge about the stylistics of memoirs, but also as an exploration of its narrative structure specifically from a cognitive perspective. The present researcher hopes that the findings will therefore have broader relevance within stylistic approaches to memoirs as it offers a cognitively oriented alternative to the existing discourse analytical approaches to the genre.

According to Emmott (2002), three distinct aims that “split self” phenomena which occur in literature fulfill are: 1) to represent the complex "multi-faceted" nature of the self, 2) to portray an "ever-changing selfhood" and 3) to function as part of the act of narration itself (p. 161). Such objectives coincide with the purposes of this research, and accordingly, this research is conducted with the following aims:

1- The analytical framework employed in this research attempts to complement TWT as a method that explains how stories are built and analyzed with cognitive

conceptual/psychological notions as split-selves and mind-styles to help it make more sense. Such an approach, proposed to be necessary for the psychological understanding of narration, is thus expected to supplement the comprehension of focalization in text-worlds by clarifying the possible perspectives prevailing in narrative worlds.

2- Leech and Short (2007) have shown that mind-styles can vary on a scale from "normality" to "deviance". Accordingly, a further purpose of this research is to show that this notion is most useful where narratives involve the foregrounding of thought processes that suggest some salient cognitive deficit or malfunction showing an unorthodox conception of the world or a particular mental affliction. Accordingly, the present research aims to show that narrative viewpoint or focalization in first-person homodiegetic narration can be best understood as a continuum of stylistic features from the universal to the idiosyncratic; from mind styles which can easily be perceived by the reader as natural and uncontrived, to those which clearly impose an abnormal deviant conception of the narrational world.

The general aim of this study is to draw together the analytical methods proposed by Cognitive Stylistics in an analysis of Susanna Kaysen's *Girl, Interrupted*, in order to show how TWT, split-self phenomena and the notion of mind-style might be integrated together in the study of extended narrative texts. In order to

investigate this from a cognitive perspective, the following specific questions are addressed:

1- What cognitive stylistic features does Kaysen employ in *Girl, Interrupted* to set up rich mental representations of text-worlds that scaffold readers' to go beyond the words in the narrative?

2- In what way can a TWT approach contribute to an understanding of/weave together different complex styles of perspective presentation in the memoir?

a) What are the different levels of text-worlds employed in the narrative?
b) How does the conceptual and psychological phenomenon of 'split-selves' interlock with TWT analysis in *Girl. Interrupted*?
c) How does the conceptual psychological notion of 'mind-style' correspond to TWT analysis *Girl. Interrupted*?
d) How do conceptual and psychological features such as 'split-selves' and 'mind-style' contribute to the representation of narrative features as focalization and point of view?

In order to better explain how it is possible for readers to become aware of and monitor narrative development, this paper suggests that concepts from split-selves might be gainfully employed within TWT. This paper thus focuses on TWT and how the concept of split-self might be mapped onto this theory as a means of further explicating the way in which readers can be manipulated into experiencing events in the story world from a variety of perspectives. The

following is a brief overview of some of the key issues in cognitive stylistics relevant to the above mentioned intent of the present analysis.

1- Cognitive Stylistics

Much recent work in stylistics has involved the integration of linguistic analysis with a range of theories of cognition under the labels "cognitive stylistics" or "cognitive poetics" (Stockwell 2014; Semino & Culpeper 2002; Gavins & Steen 2003). This has led to advances in the study of a range of fictional phenomena including the study of narrative minds and the characteristics that readers attribute to them given that the process of meaning creation is the results if interconnection between textual triggers and reader's conceptions. To restate, in Semino's (1997) terms, texts project meaning while readers construct it. The means by which readers go about constructing meaning is the central concern of cognitive stylistics which presents theories on text processing i.e., how readers navigate their way through texts and how they process textual meaning. Cognitive stylistics is thus crucially concerned with reading, and, more specifically, with the reception and subsequent interpretation processes that both unconscious and conscious cognitive and emotive processes are activated during reading procedures.

Cognitive stylistics scholars draw on different cognitive theories that deal with various aspects of the reading process to produce cognitive stylistic analytic frameworks. Such theories include

ideas from (1) cognitive linguistics (2) artificial intelligence and (3) text and narrative theories. First, cognitive linguistics includes cognitive stylistic analyses of cognitive metaphor (Crisp, 2003; Freeman, 1993, 1995); cognitive parable (Burke, 2003); cognitive grammar (Hamilton, 2003); mental spaces (Semino, 2003); figures and grounds (Stockwell, 2003); and prototypes (Gibbs, 2003). Second, the majority of cognitive stylistic studies dealing with artificial intelligence draw upon schema theory analyses. Some influential studies include Verdonk's (1999) work on Larkin's poetry and Cockcroft's (2004) work on rhetoric.

From these frameworks, the most relevant to the present research is the third category dealing with text and narrative-based analysis. Such discourse-based approaches have been influenced by studies in both narrative discourse and discourse psychology. Examples of such works are as those dealing with cognitive stylistic work on plot reversals in narrative texts (Emmott, 2003). Drawing on insights from discourse analysis, Emmott's work considers how readers construct and maintain mental representations of fictional characters and contexts. A further example in this category is Gavins's (2003) examination of difficult and odd reading conditions within a Text-world Theory (TWT henceforth) framework. Gavins's main theoretical framework relies on Werth's (1999) work on TWT which seeks to provide a framework where entire discourses can be systematically analyzed. This theory is discussed in more

detail below as it is a key model in the analytical framework used in this study.

One other recently evolving framework dealing with text and narrative-based analysis is "Cognitive Narratology," which investigates the relationship between narrtology and the human mind therefore studying the interaction between the text and the recipient who perceives and processes the narrative. Herman, (2011) defines Cognitive Narratology as the "inquiry into the range of mental states and processes that support inferences about the ontological make-up, spatiotemporal profile, and character inventory of a storyworld, and **…** cognitively inflected accounts of narrative perspective or focalization in fictional and nonfictional texts" (p.7). Accordingly, this research can be considered as related to this last category given its inquiry into how the function of shifting between different text-worlds and different selves is tied into how readers are exposed to different points of view within a text.

2- Text-world theory (TWT)

In the last decades, text linguistics and discourse theories, as part of a more general trend in functional-cognitive linguistics, have stressed the need to consider contextual factors in linguistic analysis. Paul Werth's volume *Text-worlds: Representing Conceptual Space in Discourse* is an effective framework of how contextual factors are integrated into a theory of discourse, and the need to incorporate these factors in a systematic way to understand how texts and discourses are structured,

and how they are produced and processed by interlocutors in discourse situations.

Initially developed by Werth in the late 1980s, TWT has continued to develop by such scholars as Gavins (2007) and Stockwell (2002). TWT which integrates the experiential principles of cognitive linguistics is a deictic discourse model that is designed to account for and explore "the mental spaces that construct all spoken and written discourse" (Norledge, 2012, (p. 53). Gavins argues that processing and understanding any kind of discourse, factual or fictional, is made possible through construction of mental representations in the readers' minds. These mental representations, she adds, have taken various names: "mental models" in cognitive psychology, "mental spaces" in cognitive linguistics and "text-worlds" in cognitive stylistics (Gavins, 2003, p. 129). She maintains that the key to a properly comprehensive examination and analysis of discourse is to formulate an appropriate analytical structure by means of which this complexity can better understood. This is what TWT sets out to achieve by separating every discourse into a number of distinct conceptual levels; the first of these being the discourse world, with text-world and sub-worlds stemming from it.

2-1 Levels of worlds

TWT assumes that the various layers of story, or any kind of discourse, are not located on equal levels. Accordingly, a TWT analysis begins by "separating a given discourse into three interconnected levels". The first level, called the "discourse world",

or "the situational context surrounding the speech event itself" (Werth, 1999, p. 83), which involves two or more participants engaged in a language event. It is the context in which the discourse takes place, containing participants and a perceived complete language event, the perceptions and knowledge of the participants and the basic elements of any situation, i.e. location, time, entities, and relationships (Werth,1999, pp. 83-84). During the progress of the language event, as Lahey (2006) mentions, the discourse participants build up what is known as the text-world, or the second level (p. 75).

Like the discourse world from which it arises, a text-world takes place in time and space, and is inhabited by "sentient beings", known as characters at the text-world level, and other entities and objects (Werth, 1999, pp. 86-87). In her informed review of Werth's influential book, Emmott (2000) elucidates Werth's notion of text-worlds as "the mental constructs by which a reader accumulates information from a text, interpreting and adding to this information from general knowledge" (p.371). She believes that Werth's notion of text-world is particularly relevant to literary analysis since, by definition, a text-world is composed when discourse participants speakers/hearers, writers/readers—are engaged in communication (p. 372). Stockwell (2002) defines the text-world as the "cognitive mechanism which is the means of understanding" (p. 137). It may be generally regarded as the story of the discourse or the part of the discourse that is in focus at any given time (Werth, 1999, p. 53).

Once the boundaries of the text-world are established and the discourse is progressing, further conceptual layers which comprise the third level, i.e. sub-worlds may be created. Sub-worlds originate from within the text-world and may be of three types: 'deictic' sub-worlds, signaled by spatial or temporal shifts; 'attitudinal' sub-worlds, cued by expressions of attitude; and 'epistemic' sub-worlds exhibiting epistemic modality (Werth, 1999, p. 216). These sub-worlds are generated along the construction and development of the text-world, as "departures from the parameters of the original text-world" (Gavins, 2003, p. 131).

Gavins's suggested model is a modified version of Werth's: a re-categorization of Werth's sub-worlds by including the notion of *modality* which, she believes, Werth had ignored. Consequently, by relying on Simpson's (1993) modal grammar of point of view in fiction, she uses the categories of deontic, boulomaic, and epistemic modality as further sub-categories of modal worlds. Such categories permit the points of views presented in relation to each type of modality to be more thoroughly approached.

Deontic modality expresses the degree of obligation to the performance of the specific action and includes modal auxiliaries like *may*, *should*, *must*, etc., and boulomaic modality expresses the desires of a speaker or writer and stipulates the condition for satisfying these desires. Verbs such as *hope*, *like*, *want*, and *wish* belong in this category of modality (Gavins, 2000, p. 131). The third division, "epistemic modality", depicts the worlds which

correspond to situations which are somehow "epistemically remote from either the participants in the discourse world or from the characters in the text-world"(Gavins, 2000, p. 131). Epistemic modal auxiliaries including *might* and *could* as well as modal lexical verbs such as *think*, *suppose*, and *believe* are used in construction of such sub-worlds (Gavins, 2003, p. 132).

The *world building propositions* in the text provide deictic and referential information which partially establish the text-world's situational variables such as time, location, entities and interrelationship, while *function advancing propositions* are those which provide information about actions, mental processes, states and attributes of entities in the text-world.

3- Narration and Memoirs

The main argument of Herman (2003), a prominent figure in the developing field of "Cognitive Narratology" is that readers (and, where relevant, viewers and listeners) create mental models called "story-worlds" as they comprehend narratives. These story-worlds shift the readers' perceptions from the "here and now" to the deictic coordinates of a fictional or non-fictional story, registering "who did what to and with whom, when, where, why" (p.5). The story-worlds are non-linguistic cognitive representations of what has happened in a narrative, but the construction of these story-worlds nevertheless depends on readers' responses to subtle (and sometimes ambiguous) textual cues. Memoires as a distinctive literary genre thick with

features prompting the reader's intellectual processing, lend themselves easily to Herman's cognitive approach which posits that different genres may be characterized by varying types of textual cues relating to different proportions of the story-world features of these genres.

New genres such as literary nonfiction, creative nonfiction, and documentary narrative began to be recognized since the 1970's. What distinguished these writings from conventional factual and informational texts was that they were not only accounts of real events or experiences but also artistic narratives. They employed literary techniques, including the use of first-person voice, posing questions, and inserting uncertainties and reflections into their factual texts.

Contemporary memoirs, as a subgenre of literary nonfiction, the "fourth genre", derive their power "not from self-absorbed recounting, nor from being a text version of reality, but rather from the honest unfolding of human struggles and triumphs from which important thought-provoking arguments are presented" (Hemely, 2012, p.85). Well-crafted examples of this genre read like good novels rather than dry accounts of historic or daily events. Successful and artful memoirs illustrate ways that narrative permits writers to create meaningful moments. Readers have a sense that memoirists use the form to "experiment, solve puzzles present in their lives, pose sometimes unanswerable questions, and advance hypotheses about their lived experiences" (Diana, 2014, p.200).

Although memoirs may cover a wide variety of subjects and forms, they generally share some common unique characteristics. The following are the characteristics which seem to be most relevant to the memoir at hand:

A memoir is a special kind of autobiography, usually involving a portion of the author's life as it relates to a person, historic event, or special circumstances. Accordingly, a memoir is said to be more centralized than a biography as it is a story about a time in someone's life or a major event that occurred. This is basically why this narrative genre tends to be more introspective than other narrative nonfiction.

Memoirists use a compelling first-person voice and create detailed word-pictures for their readers. Hampl (2000) notes, "The contemporary memoir has reaffirmed the primacy of the first person voice." (p. 47). They are also written almost exclusively in the past tense.

Memoirs are often episodic, making use of a number of short mini-stories of events and places. A memoir does not contain everything from this particular period of the author's life, but rather, events are selected and examined for meaning relative to the purpose of the book. It is this collection of small stories and meaningful moments that a memoirist transforms into a larger, more universal narrative that fascinates us so much as readers.

Memoirists may leave things out in the narratives. In fact Memoirists often avoid transitions. They may force readers into intellectual engagement with a text as they leave the labor of weaving

the text into a coherent narrative to the reader.

Because memoirs capture real life and tell us more about what it is to be human, they have become an integral part of the literary landscape and have come to be known as the "art of self-analysis and reflection" (Cline & Angier, 2010, p. 146). Brewer (1986) argues that the inherent self-referring nature of memoirs is a defining feature that distinguished this genre from all other types of styles in literature. Robinson (1986) proposes that memories are a "resource" of the self that could be used to sustain or change aspects of the self. Robinson (1986) further explains that memoir writing offers the option to create one's own understanding of self, as opposed to accepting an external construction of self, and in turn offers that understanding to others. Gilmore (1994) adds: "For many writers, autobiography's domain of first-person particularities and peculiarities offers an opportunity to describe their lives and their thoughts about it; to offer in some cases, corrective readings; and to emerge through writing as an agent of self-representation." (p. 64).

Memoirs can therefore function as a means for those suffering from traumatic events to assert possession of the experiences. Harris (2003) endorses the therapeutic effect of autobiographical writing stating: "Writing about painful experiences defends against world-dissolving powers that often accompany trauma, depression, and mourning" (p. 217). White (2008) adds that women who suffer from mental illness have turned to autobiography as a way to proclaim their experiences with mental illness, while at the same time reclaiming

their sense of self. According to White, *"Girl Interrupted"* can thus be considered an exceptional example of 'autopathography', to use Couser's (2011) term for an autobiographical narrative that focuses on illness and disability. Wood (1994) explains, "The study of women's autobiography is crucial because it embodies a moment when women have chosen to rupture the dominant narratives that deny their ability to speak from an "I," whether that "I" is consciously illusory or authoritative or both" (p. 67). Kaysen's memoir can thus be considered a process of "self-making through self-narration" (Ryan, 1991. p. 364).

4- Narratorial Point of View

Because of the connection between memoirs and the expression of the self, this inevitably leads us into considering existing frameworks for the analysis of point of view in prose. Classical taxonomies of point of view in prose do not adequately explain the diverse effects of viewpoints in narration, or how readers move between different viewpoints when they read (Deleyto 1991). Therefore, it is necessary to resort to cognitive models of how readers navigate texts.

Uspensky (1973) refers to two types of narration: internal and external. The term internal narration describes the type of narration that is restricted to the "subjective viewpoint" of a particular character, whereas external narration refers to the type of omniscient narrator that claims to be objective accompanied by narratorial comment on the characters and

actions described. The distinction between internal/subjective presentation of events and external/objective narration has important consequences for point of view effects. In internal narration, which corresponds with Genette's (1980) category of *homodiegetic* narration, the reader is likely to feel that the point of view is more restricted to a character. In external narration, on the other hand, the point of view expressed seems to belong more to the narrator than to the character.

In this respect, Uspensky's second category is similar to Genette's *hetrodiegetic* narration.

Genette reformulates these categories as, respectively, "Who sees?"-the imaginary position that determines how/what events are perceived-and "Who speaks?"- the identity of the telling voice, which does not necessarily coincide with the identity of the agent whose position has been chosen to convey information. Genette refers to the "regulation" of information within a narrative as *focalization;* now preferred over *point of view*. Such a distinction is what this research will be concentrating on to explain how the duality in self representation is echoed in the memoir's narratorial point of view/focalization.

Fowler (1996) in an effort to provide a more comprehensive view of the two narration types produced a taxonomy developed from Uspensky's description of point of view. Fowler's taxonomy followed a more psychological perspective and was therefore referred to by Fowler as *psychological point of view*. Fowler subdivided Uspensky's *internal* and *external* categories,

making two further divisions.

To begin with internal narration, Fowler makes a distinction between what he terms *Internal Type A* and *Internal Type B*. Internal type A is narration from a point of view within a character's consciousness, manifesting his or her feelings about, and evaluations of, the events and characters of the story; how he/she perceives events. Fowler explains that Type A narration can occur in the first-person or third-person. The most subjective form of Type A narration, according to Fowler, is that produces by a first-person narrator which displays the world view of the particular character from whose point of view the story is being told. Type B internal narration, on the other hand, reflects the point of view of someone who is not a participating character- a narrator, or the so called "omniscient" author who has knowledge of the feelings of the characters. The present study, dealing with a prose employing the "I" narrator, will concentrate on these two types of internal narration.

Turning to Fowler's category of external narration which is void of any thoughts or feeling of characters, he makes a distinction between Type C and Type D narration. In Type C, the narration does not report the inner processes of characters and is impersonal in the sense that it does not offer any judgments of character's actions. Finally in type D the narrator pretends to have no access to the internal states of characters.

5- Discourse Presentation

Free Indirect Discourse (FID) is one of the major discursive devices adopted by modern writers to depict the mental processes of characters

by combining features from both direct and indirect techniques. It is essentially the practice of embedding speech or thoughts into the narrative structure. Accordingly, it is the most problematic mode among the four major modes of representing entities' discourses, the others being Direct Discourse (DD), Indirect Discourse (ID), and Free Direct Discourse (FDD). FID is generally defined as a style of "dual voice," which arises between the teller and a character i.e., a dual perspective which involves two persons with different points of views, opinions and judgments i.e., different mind-styles. This paper uses the terms FID and FDD-involving the production of direct speech-to refer to both Free Indirect/Direct Speech and Free Indirect/Direct Thought where a distinction between speech and thought is not required.

It is claimed that FID is only possible in third-person narratives as it by definition features an overt dual perspective of the outside narrator and the fictional character. However, Cohen (1978) states that, just as FID occurs in the third-person narrations when the narrator is backgrounded and the fictional character is foregrounded, FID can also be found in first-person narrations when the emphasis is on the "experiencing self" (in its Here and Now) and when the "narrating self" is back grounded. Stanzel (1984) adds that FID style in first-person narratives can be used to create a kind of "latitude of expression" for the expression of the experiencing self where it can express itself "undisturbed" by the other "persona"-the narrating self. According to Stanzel, FID also promotes the reader's empathy

with the experiencing self.

6- Mind-style

In cognitively viewing the notion of viewpoint in narratives, the notions of mind and consciousness have become increasingly central to the concerns of narratologists. Fludernik (1996), for example, defines "narrativity" itself in terms of "experientiality", and explains that because humans are conscious human beings, narratives always imply the protagonist's consciousness. Palmer (2003) also views the representation of characters' minds as central to the definition and study of narrative fiction and asserts that narrative fiction is, in essence, the presentation of fictional mental functioning. It follows then that the study of narration is the study of mental representation and that the task of the analyst is to make explicit the various means by which this phenomenon is utilized and manipulated, as this research will endeavour to do.

In relation to the connectivity between narration and mental processing, Chatman (1978) stresses the distinction between what he calls literal and figurative viewpoints by defining these categorically as, respectively, *perceptual and conceptual* point of view. Perceptual point of view is an optical viewpoint, i.e. exactly that which a character physically sees. It can then be seen to arise from a particular spatio-temporal location. A character's conceptual point of view, on the other hand, is not what he or she physically sees, but is rather a manifestation of his or her ideology, beliefs, attitudes

or *mind-style*, as will be explained below.

One other addition of Fowler (1996), of utmost importance to the present study, is his introduction of the term *mind-style*. Fowler explains that each individual's understanding of the world will be slightly different as a result of the social environment into which they were born, the patterns of interaction they were involved in, and the experiences in general that they have had. Any articulation of mind-style will constitute the expression of a particular way of understanding the world, and this clearly relates to the expression of cognitive or conceptual point of view.

The notion of "mind-style", was introduced by Fowler in order to capture "any distinctive linguistic representation of an individual 'mental self' and to constitute an interface between cognition and personality, on the one hand, and narration on the other" (p. 284) i.e., to describe the way in which particular features of a text can project the cognitive traits of specific characters and/or narrators, and reflect the way they conceptualize and make sense of the world around them.

Semino (2002) uses *world view* as a general term to refer to "the overall view of reality of the text actual world" (p. 101). The term *mind-style* is used by Semino to capture those aspects of world views that are primarily personally cognitive in origin, and which are peculiar to a particular individual, or common to people who have the same cognitive characteristics (for example as a result of similar mental illness or of a shared stage of cognitive development).

According to Semino, these aspects include an individual's characteristic cognitive habits, abilities and limitations, and any beliefs or values that may arise from them. This is consistent with Fowler's (1996) reference to "any distinctive linguistic representation of an individual mental self" (p. 74) in his definition of mind-style.

The notion of mind-style could be thus seen to link directly to Harris's (1984) notion of *paradigms of reality*. He explains that people can have "radically different perspectives of reality" (Harris, 1984, p.18). This particular 'perspective of reality' equates to the point of view that every person has. Harris explains that the reality paradigm within which a person operates when communicating with others will have bearings on the mind-style that they exhibit. These mental representations may vary in the extent to which they are personal and idiosyncratic, or shared with other individuals or groups.

It follows from the above that the mind-style which is likely to be most noticeable and interestingly interpretive is that which is in some way deviate from normal assumptions. Bockting's (1995) analysis is most relevant to the present study as he presents as an example of an interdisciplinary approach that has been called *psychostylistics,* which merges modern developments in stylistics with narrative psychology and psychiatry. More specifically, Bockting makes reference to psychoanalysis and psychiatry in order to define mind-style and to interpret the significance of the

different ways in characters project their points of view. Accordingly, the paradigm reality of Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD henceforth) patients will be utilized in this research as the main indicator of a particular mind-style in order to explain the projections and perspectives of such idiosyncratic mental constructions. Such an approach necessitates a brief overview of the mental illness of BPD.

7- Borderline Personality Disorder

According to the *American Psychiatric Association*, the essential feature of BPD is a pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affects, and marked impulsivity beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by five (or more) of the following:

1- Frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment.

2- A pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships characterized by alternating between extremes of idealization and devaluation

3- Identity disturbance: markedly and persistently unstable self-image or sense of self.

4- Impulsivity in at least two areas that are potentially self-damaging (e.g., spending, sex, substance abuse, reckless driving, binge eating).

5- Suicidal behavior, gestures, or threats, or self-mutilating behavior.

6- Affective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood and feelings of emptiness (e.g., intense episodic dysphoria, irritability, or anxiety usually lasting a few hours and only rarely more than a few days).

7- Inappropriate, intense anger or difficulty controlling anger (e.g., frequent displays of temper, constant anger, recurrent physical fights).

8- Transient, stress-related paranoid ideation or severe dissociative symptoms.

What are most relevant to the present study are those symptoms of BPD that are referred to as 'cognitive-perceptual symptoms'- those persistent symptoms operating within a dysfunctional belief system in patients with BPD that are usually 'structuralized' i.e., built into the patient's cognitive organization. These symptoms, according to the *American Psychiatric Association,* constitute deeply ingrained belief systems often referred to as 'dissociative features'. Patients with borderline personality disorder displaying this dimension exhibit suspiciousness, referential thinking - persistent tendency to relate material to one's self -, paranoid ideation, illusions, derealization (experience of unreality of the outside world), depersonalization (experience of unreality in one's sense of self), or hallucination-like and psychotic-like symptoms (mental state involving a loss of contact with reality). These symptoms will be referred to in more detail during the analysis as needed.

8- Split-Selves

The symptom of being disassociated from reality and oneself brings to mind the phenomenon of the "split-self" in literature which explores a range of issues around the nature of perspective or point of view. It may represent the psychological

fracturing of an entity, or the multitudinous nature of its consciousness. An examination of split-self examples in narratives may, therefore, reveal a broader understanding of the act of narration as it sets descriptions of different versions of an individual alongside each other and thereby provide a dual or multiple focalizer for the reader. This notion is utilized here as it is seen to constitute the alter-selves of the memoir.

Emmott (2002) points out that the theme of 'split-selves' is omnipresent in literature and found in many different types of narrative text, both fictional and non-fictional. The phenomenon commonly occurs at times of "personal crisis" and is seen as reflecting the "fragmentary nature of individual human identity" (Emmott, 2002, p.153). The phenomenon can be particularly evident in the case of autobiographical literature and memoirs, since, as Emmott states: "first-person narratives generally invoke a current self reporting on a past self and since breaks in narrative chronology (such as flashbacks) provide the means of juxtaposing different versions of an individual at different points in time"(Emmott, 2002, p.153-4).

This last particular manifestation of "split self" phenomena is what the present researcher hopes to identify in Kaysen's memoir. This is because, although Emmott states that fictional texts can provide greater possibilities of splitting than non-fictional, nevertheless, she adds that non-fictional text can contain "embedded fictional stories and imaginary split-selves within an autobiographical framework" (Emmott, 2002, p.155), and that

non-fictional "life stories" can include complex extended exhibitions of changing selves and their social circumstances.

Emmott further points out that Cognitive Linguistic Theory has succeeded in 'handling' 'the range of "split-self" phenomena found in narrative texts' (154) in a number of different ways, most of which relate to reference theory. Firstly, it was through the consideration of metaphors of self that Lakoff (1996) illustrated how humans conceptualize their consciousness as a multifaceted entity, comprising many different and often-conflicting aspects. His study revealed that people have "not one form of consciousness but many" (Lakoff, 1996, p.101) and that as individuals we "sometimes conceptualize different aspects of ourselves or mental processes ... as "people in conflict" (Lakoff, 1996, p.105). Secondly, Fauconnier's work on 'mental space' theory further engages with co-referentiality, and endeavours to explain why certain instances of co-referentiality may seem illogical, but are actually comprehensible to the reader. Many of Fauconnier's examples relate to entities and their corresponding "counterparts" in other realms, such as in paintings, the imagination etc., and as such have links to stylistic approaches such as 'Possible World Theory' and 'Blending Theory'.

Emmott (2002) continues to explain states that "The 'split self' phenomena are complex and wide-ranging." She explains that this complexity arises partly from the nature of the self, yielding splits due to its mental/physical instantiation ("mind-mind", "mind-

body" and "body-body" splits) and the fact that humans function in different social roles ("social-self" splits) and have the ability to reflect on possible selves ("real--imaginary" self splits). Emmott further adds that the fact that the self changes over time also provides temporal differences ("time l-time 2" splits). In addition to this, the nature of narrative can add to the possibilities of presenting different versions of the self (e.g. narrative juxtapositions and double/multiple voice narration). It is precisely this last category that the present research is concerned with.

Benstock (1988) argues that it is feasible that one's actual self, and one's self image may never coincide, "not because certain forms of self-writing are not self-conscious enough but because they have no investment in creating a cohesive self over time" (p.18). Smith and Watson (2001) support this assessment arguing that autobiographical narratives do not affirm a true self or a coherent stable identity, but are rather "performative, situated addresses that invite their readers' collaboration in producing specific meanings for life" (p.324).

Accordingly, the idea of a unified or cohesive self, such as the 'universal subject', no longer provides an adequate understanding of the role self/identity plays in a narrative in relation to point of view both with respect to author and reader. One's subjectivity and sense of self will fluctuate along with the various stages of the text-worlds of the narrative. By adopting the notion of dual subjectivities, a split-self approach to memoires recognizes a fragmented self. There can be no ubiquitous

focalizer when the narrating consciousness has been broken down into "fluctuating fragments" or has been split into a "bi-faceted self" (Browse, 2013, p. 285).

In the field of narratology, Werth's 'TWT has offered an explanation of how narrative sub-worlds are created, "including the representation of the beliefs, dreams and fantasies of characters" (Emmott, 2002, p.160). Emmott further adds that Werth's theory is already being used by stylisticians to analyse literary texts and could be a productive tool in examining worlds and selves in narratives. The present paper is a continuation of this last endeavor as Werth's (1999) work expands on cognitive linguistic ideas and offers a broad-ranging analysis of how narrative sub-worlds are created which could include the representation of the split-selves/worlds of characters.

In conclusion, Emmott (2002) states that, "A full understanding of the nature of selfhood in extended narratives generally requires some understanding of a particular person's past history in order to understand the effect of a traumatic event on their sense of identity." (p.72). The following is a brief account of the author and plot of *Girl, Interrupted.*

Susanna Kaysen was born and raised in Cambridge, Massachusetts, which is the subject of her new novel, *Cambridge*, published in 2014. She is the daughter of economist Carl Kaysen, a professor at MIT and former advisor to President John F. Kennedy, and his wife Annette Neutra Kaysen. Kaysen has one sister and is divorced. She lived for a time in

the Faroe Islands, upon which experience her 1994 novel *Far Afield* is based.

Kaysen attended high school at the Commonwealth School in Boston, and the Cambridge School before being sent to McLean Hospital in 1967 to undergo psychiatric treatment for depression. It was there that she was diagnosed with BPD and released after eighteen months. She later drew on this experience for her 1993 memoir *Girl, Interrupted*. As the author of this bestseller, she revealed the dramatic story of her 18 months in McLean psychiatric hospital to the world. Her memoir was later made into a film in 1999 which won Angelina Jolie an Oscar; Kaysen was portrayed by Winona Ryder. Kaysen's initial attempt at self-representation in *Girl, Interrupted* was followed by a second medical memoir, *The Camera My*

Mother Gave Me, published in 2002. However, *Girl, Interrupted* is by far more revealing of her mental dilemmas and disturbed self as *The Camera My*

Mother Gave Me mainly concentrates on relating her two-year search for relief from an omnipresent physical pain rather than a psychological one.

9-1 Plot summary

In April 1967, 18-year-old Susanna Kaysen is admitted to McLean Hospital, in Belmont, Massachusetts, after attempting suicide by overdosing on pills. She denies that it was a suicide attempt to a psychiatrist, who suggests she take time to recuperate in McLean, a private mental hospital. Susanna is diagnosed there with BPD, and her stay extends to 18 months rather than the initially proposed couple of weeks.

Beginning with her voluntary admission to McLean in 1967, Kaysen sketches in her memoir a series of vignettes, or short chapters, about her stay at the hospital, the events that preceded it, and her life following her release. Compiling documents from her medical files, she summons up memories of those years, fusing them into a compelling parody that captures details of the time, the place, the people, and the events that were part of her "interrupted" life. Evidently the plot of *Girl, Interrupted* does not follow a linear/chronological storyline, but instead the author provides personal stories through a series of short descriptions of events and personal reflections.

Fellow patients Polly, Cynthia, Lisa, Lisa Cody, Georgina, and Daisy contribute to Susanna's experiences at McLean as she describes their personal issues and how they come to cope with the time they must spend in the hospital. Susanna also introduces the reader to particular staff members, including Valerie, Dr. Wick and Mrs. McWeeney. What results is a memoir that captures "an exquisite range of self-awareness between madness and insight" (Caldwell, 1993, p.88). Kaysen provides her readers with an exploration of a life placed along the socially constructed borderlands of illness and sanity.

Holding the various threads of the past together are Kaysen's memories of a painting, Vermeer's Girl Interrupted at Her Music, which she views at the Frick Museum just before her breakdown in 1967 and again

fifteen years after her recovery. The obvious inspiration for the book's title, Kaysen describes Girl Interrupted at Her Music as "the painting from whose frame a girl looks out, ignoring her beefy music teacher, whose proprietary hand rests on her chair" (Kaysen, 1993, pp.165–166). Through her memories of viewing Vermeer's painting, Kaysen skillfully and poignantly suggests the memoir's intricate themes.

General Analysis

6.1 Text-Worlds

Girl, Interrupted chronicles Kaysen's stay at McLean through a series of vignettes that describe a "parallel universe" in a psychiatric hospital. The reader is made aware of a dichotomy in text-worlds from the very onset of the narrative as Kaysen opens her memoir with a segment entitled Toward a Topography of the Parallel Universe saying:

> People ask, How did you get in there? What they really want to know is if they are likely to end up in there as well. I can't answer the real question. All I can tell them is, It's easy And it is easy to slip into a parallel universe. There are so many of them: worlds of the insane, the criminal, the crippled, the dying, perhaps of the dead as well. These worlds exist alongside this world and resemble it, but are not in it….
>
> But most people pass over incrementally, making a series of perforations in the membrane between here and there until an opening exists. And who can resist an opening? In the parallel universe the laws of physics

are suspended. What goes up does not necessarily come down, a body at rest does not tend to stay at rest, and not every action can be counted on to provoke an equal and opposite reaction. Time, too, is different. It may run in circles, flow backward, skip about from now to then. The very arrangement of molecules is fluid: Tables can be clocks; faces, flowers. These are facts you find out later, though. Another odd feature of the parallel universe is that although it is invisible from this side, once you are in it you can easily see the world you came from. Sometimes the world you came from looks huge and menacing, quivering like a vast pile of jelly, at other times it is miniaturized and alluring, a-spin and shining in its orbit. Either way, it can't be discounted. Every window on Alcatraz has a view of San Francisco. (pp.5-6)

This opening passage is a brilliant evocation of a "parallel universe" to be set within the "kaleidoscopically shifting" text-worlds of the memoir. Kaysen's words here, which inspire laughter and compassion, as well as fear, portray vivid portraits of the world she enters, and the world she left. Kaysen while comparing insanity to an alternate world, talks about the concept of a parallel universe and how easy it is to slip into one. Kaysen explains that some people suffering from mental illness do not enter the parallel universe immediately, but, eventually, and that the temptation to cross over is irresistible as the alternate reality replaces the familiar. Once in the

parallel universe, one is perfectly aware of the world left behind. In this other world everything is different, including time, the laws of physics, and even the way everyday things appear to the eye. She evaluates the benefits of being in the hospital and being in the outside world-two parallel universes each of which presents freedoms of different kinds. The hospital provides freedom from responsibility, but is also a prison in that many freedoms and choices that the patients would have outside the hospital are taken away.

The title of this segment itself embodies the underlying 'mega-metaphor', as it were, of the memoir. Kaysen seems to deliberately start her narrative in a direct and engaging way, harnessing the affective force of this extended metaphor on the reader and introducing him to the textual universe (s) he or she will be experiencing during the discourse. It is as if Girl, Interrupted describes Kaysen's struggle to transcend across the boundary that separates her from these two parallel universes.

With reference to TWT, the over arching frame of the narrative is, by default, the discourse-world shared between author and reader. However, as the above lines illustrate, what comes across to the analyst as unique is that within this general frame are two 'matrix text-worlds'- the worlds of sanity and insanity, security and vulnerability- which belong to two selfhoods, as will be discussed below. As the narrative proceeds, an array of 'specific text-worlds' can be distinguished within these two matrix text-worlds from which they originate dealing with the

different happenings she undergoes. In turn, each of these 'specific text-worlds' themselves comprises further embedded sub-worlds. It is the reader's rather strenuous task while navigating amidst these parallel universes to track the switches between the matrix text-worlds and integrate between the other specific text- and sub-worlds as they unravel.

The two matrix text-worlds are juxtaposed as they represent two extreme worlds: the first belonging to the 'sane' and the second to the 'insane'; one after Kaysen was 'interrupted' and another before and during the 'interruption'. To use Kaysen's words, each world has its distinct *"topography"*. Kaysen's parallel universe is a complete alternative universe which incorporates characters' fantasies, dreams, hallucinations and psychotic episodes during which both the narration and the characters are completely recentered within this alter universe. In addition, each of the matrix text-worlds has, as it were, its own version/self of the 'girl' who was interrupted, as the title of the memoir metaphorically suggests.

2- Split-Selves

A fascinating feature of the narratorial structure of the narrative worlds of the memoir is that the two matrix text-worlds seem to be correlated to two distinct selfhoods or voices. The first matrix text-world is inhabited by Kaysen the adult author/narrator of the memoir who recovered from a personality disorder, while the second matrix text-world belongs to Susanna the adolescent protagonist who is a BPD patient.

In *Girl, Interrupted* the narrator is not just a textual construct like

any other and the worlds she presents are reflective of her own thoughts and opinions. This relates to how Emmott (2002) describes the "split selves" phenomenon in real life where a character in a novel or a real life individual is "divided or duplicated in any way in the narrative"(p.154). She argues that cognitive linguistic theory can provide some insights into the "split selves" phenomenon in texts where the narrative itself "creates different selves by juxtaposing different description and different voices"(p.177). It is precisely this cognitive-stylistic account of split-selves that Emmott describes in fiction and non-fiction that is manifested in Kaysen's memoir as it becomes the reader's task to detect the split of the narrating selves within the dual text-worlds of the narrative discussed above.

Emmott further explains that two of the purposes that 'split self' phenomena in literature fulfill are to represent the complex, 'multi-faceted' nature of the self and as a function of the act of narration itself. These purposes accurately reflect another feature of the narratorial structure of the memoir which is that the duality in the representation of the 'split-self' in the narrative reflects the dual nature of 'focalization' in the text. Accordingly, what comes across as both intriguing and thought provoking to the reader is the interplay between the matrix text-worlds of 'sanity' and 'insanity' encapsulated in the narrative. Such interplay allows the retelling of the traumatic past through the consciousnesses of both an eighteen year old adolescent and her adult self as it unfolds in the memoir giving credit to the

assumption that the power and poignancy of the narrative is the result of the interaction between the two text-worlds with the double selves and voices they embody.

It has been observed by narratologists (e.g. Genette 1980; Bal 1997), that first person narration intertwines different voices of an individual, since most first person narration involves a narrating self looking back in time at events involving an earlier version of the self. Accordingly, Kaysen's narrative can be described as "double-voiced" (Bakhtin 1973), in that the two encompassing text-worlds created in the memoir belong to the two split-selves. Text-World1-the world of sanity-corresponds to Self1, the narrator, and Text-World2-the world of insanity-corresponds to Self2 the protagonist. The binary notations of Text-World1/Text-World2 and Self1/Self2 to refer to the dichotomies of worlds and selves respectively will be used henceforth.

Coordinates of the Two Matrix Text-Worlds

1- World building elements for matrix Text-World1

A. Time: After discharge from a private mental hospital; 1969-present time (After interruption)**.**

B. Location: Real outside world (Actual Universe)

C. Characters/entities: Self1-Kaysen the adult sane/recovered author and narrator of the memoir .

2- World building elements for matrix Text-World2

A. Time: before and during the 18 months of confinement in a

private mental hospital; 1967-1969. (Before and during interruption).

B. Location: McLean Psychiatric Hospital, Belmont, Massachusetts (Parallel Universe).

C. Characters/entities:

Self2- Susanna the adolescent insane/patient and protagonist of the memoir.

3- Points of view and Focalization

The fact that there are two encompassing text-worlds within the discourse world inhabited by two distinct selfhoods allows for the possibility of interpreting those worlds from different points of view. In other words, because the discourse-world in this memoir comprises two major text-worlds, the narrative consciousness switches between that of Self1 and Self2. On a text-world-by-text-world basis the focalizer changes so that in certain respects, another version of the narrating self is present in the different narrative worlds. Both the 'perceiving self' and the' perceived self' alternate in relating the episodes yielding a dynamic representation of the events. This renders the narrative consciousness dualistic since it encompasses two voices creating a rich and complex narrative that lends itself to various interpretations. This interaction between the two world-levels is clearly a key part of the readers' experience of the events.

Emmott (2002) introduces her study by saying that the theme of split self "can be found in non-fictional narratives, since it commonly occurs at times of personal crisis" (p.153). Moreover, Gilmore (2001) argues that a first-person account of trauma represents an intervention in, even an

interruption of, the whole meaning-making process. As a result, Kaysen's mental illness allows her to relay the events from another vantage point. In Kaysen's story we have such a figure of an independent and active 'self' coexisting with a disturbed psychotic 'self' which makes their corresponding selves, alternatively, a focalizer and a focalized, i.e. while Self1's cognitive processes are responsible for certain reflections and arguments, others are Self2's responsibility; while Self2 is at times a psychological focalizer of her disturbed reality, she is at other instances psychologically focalized by Self1. Generally speaking, instead of making simple links between words in the memoir, the reader is obliged to make inferences about "cognitively-constructed entities in cognitively-constructed worlds" (Emmott, 1997, p.190).

In examining the dual-focalization of the memoir as a whole, the present research draws on Emott's (2002) suggestion that one approach to the identification and analysis of split-selves is through the pronoun system and co-referential terms as they can signify different sets of properties rather than signaling equivalent notions.

In relation to this, general analysis of the memoir reveals that co-referential terms such as 'I', 'me' 'myself' do not necessarily denote identical entities. They may refer either to Self1 or Self2 according to the text-world within which the episode is placed.

This aligns with James's (1890) classic dual construction of the 'self-as-knower' (Self1), versus the 'self-as-known' (Self2), and shows that the memoir has "not

one form of consciousness but many" (Lakoff, 1996, p. 101).

Accordingly, the variations of the 'I' presented in the memoir have to be considered in tracking the different selves as pronouns have to be interpreted for the reader to be aware of the designated point of view. The analysis also showed that co-referentiality was used to refer to present and past counterparts/selves of the character/narrator and not a single and unitary selfhood. The analysis further illustrates how the continuous splitting in worlds and selves prevents the 'I' of the memoir from directly coinciding with the ' I ' of the author. Smith (1990) eloquently summarizes this feature of the memoir saying that splittings of all kinds intervene in direct access to the 'self in texts: splitting between author and narrator; between narrator and narrated; between 'I' now and the 'I' then; between 'I' and 'me'; between the ideological 'I' and the experiencing 'I' (p.150). All this provides evidence of the intricate processing work involved in reading the memoir, reinforcing Fauconnier's (1994) cognitive position that "Language does not carry meaning, it guides it."

4- Mind-Styles

If we are to detect how the events of the text-worlds in the memoir are filtered through the consciousness of two selfhoods, it is here that we need to examine the mind-style of each of these two selves. The self-biased mind-style - assignment to a specific focalizer of all cognitive, perceptual and emotional actions and states - can signal to the reader which voice he is following. The focalizer's thought processing/presentation

i.e., mind-style, can thus convey a different "self" from the narrator's "self".

According to the literature, the two most central and interrelated aspects which need to be considered in capturing the phenomena of mind-styles are an entity's internal representation of the world they live in and the workings of their mind. These aspects correspond to the well-established notions of representations and processes in psychology and cognitive science (Mandler, 1985). In this respect, the mind-styles evoked in Kaysen's memoir exhibit degrees of reflexivity, impressionism and argumentation, ranging from elaborated analytical/sophisticated deliberation, to spontaneous instinctive unorthodox impression. The reader thus experiences varying degrees of narratorial perceptual, and psychological and intellectual involvement or activity in the rendering of the events of the memoir leaving him in a disturbing position of being suspended between the worlds of the two selves and their distinctive mind-styles. Thus, the mind-style features that function as triggers informing the reader in which matrix text-world a particular narration or event is rooted, aid the reader in disambiguating focalizer ambiguity.

Self1's mind-style comes across clearly to the reader when the narratorial responsibility is formally acknowledged. Through Kaysen's blunt, somewhat detached words, she forcefully impresses the shocking conditions she endured on the memory of her readers. Writing in a subtle, delineated and invigorating style, she suggests the actual reality of

her situation in her objective observations of her experiences. This mind-style strikes readers as composed, intellectual, rational, and controlled; qualities normally associated with sanity. Her mind-style is vocalized via a voice full of sarcasm, characterized by a "minimalist" nature that leaves much to the imagination. However, as we go deeper into the narration another voice seems to resonate that seems to be playing against what it is describing and heightening it. It is then that the reader's perception of the narrator changes and is able to detect the presence of another selfhood.

Showing an unorthodox conception of the world-a particular mental affliction, Self2 has some odd assumptions about how the world works. Throughout the story she puts forward some very strange arguments and flawed reasoning illustrating how she grasps the reality surrounding her. It is as if the abnormal reality paradigm within which she is operating is affecting her reasoning abilities. As a result, we gradually build up a picture of what appears to be a deviant mind-style caused by a genuine cognitive impairment. In other words, there are several features of her mind-style which are unique and distinctive of a mentally impaired person suffering from some kind of cognitive limitation; put more precisely, features of an idiosyncratic mind style of a person experiencing BPD.

Self2-aged 18 at the time of her admission-and as such her behavioral patterns struggle with her self-image. She is constantly despondent and depressed due to affective instability. She engages in self-harm, experiences differing

levels of dissociation and identity disturbance, displays frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment and exhibits a pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships characterized by alternating between extremes of idealization and devaluation. Thus Kaysen's Self2, to a great extent, meets the criteria for BPD. In addition, as a BPD patient, Self2 displays the dimension of *cognitive-perceptual symptoms* as she exhibits suspiciousness, referential thinking, paranoid ideation, illusions, derealization, depersonalization, or hallucination-like symptoms. As the ensuing analysis of the extracts will show, all these symptoms indicate the habits of her mind, her cognitive processing, her perceptual difficulties and thus are what make up her 'inner world' and mind-style.

5- Discourse Presentation

In relation to thought and speech presentation through which both narratorial viewpoint and character perspective are mediated, the memoir as a whole seems to be presented in the mode of FID (Leech & Short 2007), or Narrated Monologue (Cohen 1978). In other words, the narrative moves back and forth between the narrator telling us what the character is thinking and showing us the character's conscious thoughts, without explicitly denoting which thought belongs to whom.

Given that the narrative structure of *Girl, Interrupted* is characterized by a split in perspective and narrating self, it lends itself readily to the FID style in thought presentation. As discussed above, in *Girl,*

Interrupted the character-narrator is not one entity, but two: a narrator standing outside the story (Self1), and a character inside it (Self2), who inadvertently happen to share the same name. The result is a story that reads almost like it shares two mind/voices or selves: one belonging to the narrator, the other to her double. The narrator thus reports the 'dual-voice' representing thoughts and speech in the memoir through two different discourse modes corresponding to the two selves. In other words, despite the fact that the overall technique of narrative presentation in the memoir is FID, each of the two voices/selves in the memoir seems to exhibit its own distinctive way of putting forward its judgments and reflections. The two voices/selves appear to vary along the continuum of "Psychic Distance" (Gardner, 2001) in expressing their thoughts.

As a storyteller, Self1 appears to adopt a more observer/detached approach in conveying her thoughts. Her universe-Matrix Text-World1- is described to the reader by a narrator who seems to have a "floating" perspective" in this text-world. Thus, from this text-world position, reader and narrator explore the text-world's "topography" together, and the reader is thus able to comprehend the discourse from the same floating perspective as that occupied by the narrator. In addition, Self1's style in recounting of events and thoughts develops at times into what Cohen (1978) terms as 'Psycho-Narration' in that it involves presentation of narration consciousness in the language of the narrator rather than in the mental language-mind-style-of the character.

Furthermore, Self1's mode of discourse presentation is basically that of FID discussed above. Sometimes it is more of a "Narrative Report" (NR) (Leech & Short 2007), whether that is of action (NRA), of state (NRS) or of thought (NRT). Such modes favor a holistic presentation of thought with a backgrounding function encompassing other specifics. Self1's discourse offers commentaries and analyses of thoughts and events which are filtered through the narrator perspective. A final remark on Self1's type of narration is that it corresponds to Fowler's (1996) internal type B narration of his taxonomy of narration, discussed earlier, where sub-categories are used to account for the varying degrees of 'subjectivity' (closeness to character). This is because the characteristics of Self1's narrational style resemble those of the omniscient external narrator rather than the character-based viewpoint of type A internal narration. Sane/normal/recovered Self1 can certainly relay information not available to the still mentally deranged Self2, and perceive facts beyond Self2's comprehension.

Self2's mode of discourse presentation is a few steps away from Self1's discourse style towards the more personalized end of the psychic distance continuum. As a more personal mode of discourse presentation, Self2's narratorial style can be more adequately described as a type FDD (Leech & Short 2007), or Interior Monologue (Cohen 1978) which allows direct access to the character's mindset. Interior Monologue expresses a character’s

cognitive and emotional experiences revealing his/her internal state of mind. This mode thus gives a sense of both immediacy and intimacy to the narrative representation. Because internal monologue presents intensely the flow of thought through a character's mind, it has become synonymous with what is known as the 'Stream of Consciousness Technique' which portrays the cognitive processes of a character.

A feature of Interior Monologue that makes it typical of the discourse of Self2 is that it reveals a character's internal state of mind as if it were presented unconsciously i.e., no external deliberate effort is made to render the discourse eloquent or unambiguous. That is to mean, it genuinely portrays the original mind-style of the character mimicking as much as is possible the manner in which this character might have in reality contemplated a certain thought rather than in a logical coherent manner. As will become evident from the following analysis of extracts, Self2's discourse exhibits the idiosyncratic features of a mentally disturbed person; put more precisely, it exhibits the mind-style of a BPD patient. Finally, with respect to type of narration, Self2's type of narration corresponds to Fowler's (1996) internal type A narration; the most subjective type of narration in Fowler's taxonomy which he describes as written with clear indicators of the character's "world-view" or presentation of their thoughts being evident (Fowler 1996, pp. 170-171).

The analysis of the extracts from *Girl, interrupted* which follows demonstrates how each of

the levels of TWT can operate within a narrative structure expressing a dichotomy of self-representation designated via particular mind-styles. To achieve this, the analysis traces divided worlds and split-selves through discussing extracts from the narrative and examining how instances of splitting and/or of different versions of entities seem to arise naturally from the points of view used to convey an event or perspective in the various text-worlds built into the narrative of the memoir. The analysis hopes to show how such functioning leading to duality in focalization results in a narrative more difficult to manage than others. Therefore, the upcoming text-world analysis of extracts from the text serves not only to provide a descriptive account of the dual perspectives in operation, but also offers a means of discussing the texture of this unique narrative experience.

Analysis of Extracts

1- Extracts related to Self1

1-1 Extract 1: "Suicide"

I had an inspiration once. I woke up one morning and I knew that today I had to swallow fifty aspirins. It was my task: my job for the day. I lined them up on my desk and took them one by one, counting. I could have stopped, at ten, or at thirty. And I could have done what I did do, which was go onto the street and faint. Fifty aspirin is a lot of aspirin, but going onto the street and fainting is like putting the gun back in the drawer…

Suicide is a form of murder--premeditated murder. It isn't something you do the first time you think of doing it. It takes getting used to. And you need the means,

the opportunity, the motive. A successful suicide demands good organization and a cool head, both of which are usually incompatible with the suicidal state of mind. It's important to cultivate detachment… The motive is paramount. Without a strong motive, you're sunk…

Actually, it was only part of myself I wanted to kill: the part that wanted to kill herself, that dragged me into the suicide debate and made every window, kitchen implement, and subway station a rehearsal for tragedy. I didn't figure this out, though, until after I'd swallowed the fifty aspirin…I felt good. I wasn't dead, yet something was dead. Perhaps I'd managed my peculiar objective of partial suicide. I was lighter, airier than I'd been in years. (pp. 35-36)

Context of extract:

In this vignette Kaysen reflects on her suicide attempt that partly led to her admission to the mental hospital. She compares suicide to premeditated murder, declaring that detachment, planning, and motive are necessary if one is to successfully take his own life. She asserts that her judgments prompted a kind of internal debate about whether to live or die. At a later point Kaysen realized that she did not really want to die; she only wanted to kill the part of her that was more inclined to end its existence. Eventually, the police found Kaysen and rushed her to the hospital where she had the contents of her stomach pumped. As an after effect of the suicide attempt, Kaysen felt relieved , as though she had successfully committed the "partial suicide" she imagined would better her existence.

Mind-style and split-self analysis:

In the first part of the extract the focalizer's voice is relating an older event which took place prior to the past events of the memoir. In narrating the incident of the suicide, the storyteller/voice seems to be an all-knowing, all-wise relater, not only conscious of the actions, but also of the impulses and motives behind them, the most prominent of which being 'detachment', a persistent motif all through the memoir. Such clairvoyance is echoed in her words, "A successful suicide demands good organization and a cool head, both of which are usually incompatible with the suicidal state of mind. It's important to cultivate detachment… the motive is paramount. Without a strong motive, you're sunk…" The relater is also informed enough so as to pass judgment and deem the attempt as a half-hearted one lacking full conviction expressed in her words, "…going onto the street and fainting is like putting the gun back in the drawer." This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the relater even proposes alternative scenarios to the event showing that she is fully aware of the situation and is thus able to scrutinize those memories. The tone of the words also comes across to the reader as dispassionate and aloof. All this leads the reader to conclude that it cannot be the disturbed and confused Self2 talking, but the omniscient narrator of the memoir, Self1.

The final part of the extract is exceptionally revealing. Self1 speaks of the "*partial suicide*" she underwent following her suicide attempt. By taking the life of the part of her that wanted to kill

herself, i.e., by taking the life of Self2, Self1 admits, ironically, that she freed/saved herself from the part of herself that was urging her to commit complete suicide and, therefore, felt freer and more alive. Karl Menninger (1983) expressed this condition by stating that "Local self-destruction is a form of partial suicide to avert total suicide in which the suicidal impulse may be concentrated upon a part as a substitute for the whole' (cited in Favazza, 2011, p. 203). These lines of the extract are not only a conscious psychoanalysis of one's case, but also, and most importantly a mindful acknowledgment, on Self1's part, of the existence of an alternative self, Self2, supporting the conclusion of the present study. The analysis of irrational ideas in terms of the rational, and providing assessments of past situations are peculiar to Self1's mind-style and contribute to her text-world. According to all the above, the first person 'I' in this extract can only refer to the rational, "after-the-event-narrator".

Text-world and sub-worlds analysis:

Since the focalizer of this extract has been established as Self1, the matrix text-world within which it is positioned is Text-World1, and the reader is to draw upon the particulars of this matrix text-world if he is to adequately comprehend the implications of the relator's words. This is despite the fact that it was Self2, and not Self1, who underwent the experience portrayed. The first sentence of this extract, "*I had an inspiration once.* I *woke up one morning and I knew that today I had to swallow fifty aspirins",* provides the coordinates, or world –building elements that outline the

specific text-world the reader will be introduced to. This is set off by the temporal co-ordinates *'once'* and *'one morning'* which place the events one step further in the past beyond the general time-zone of the memoir i.e., at a point earlier to the mainstream narrative i.e., before "interruption".

The reader is introduced to the first sub-world in the extract triggered by the modal lexical verb *'knew'* which signifies that the function-advancing details of the suicide which follow belong in a remote sub-world at a farther epistemic distance from the world in which the focalizer exists. Therefore, this perception verb, constructs a flashback sub-world which is also an epistemic sub-world as it involves the action of recalling performed by Self1.

The reader is then moved towards the second hypothetical sub-world extended through the hypothetical construction *'could have'*. The second sub-world is triggered by this epistemic modal auxiliary, used twice, to express possibility with the temporal co-ordinate being specified as *'today'*, which is incompatible with the past tense. The inconsistency of the temporal predicate and the verb tense is justified on the basis that the sub-world had transported the current narrative totally into the context of this former event evoking its specific temporal coordinates other than those of the main narrative. Such conjecturing expressed in this sub-world could only be contemplated by the mature Self1.

Given that in TWT terms, FID, like all forms of thought presentation, is considered as an

epistemic modal-world, the narrative evolves into yet another epistemic sub-world in the form of an extended afterthought or contemplative monologue. Self1 is responsible for the creation of this sub-world here as it is her objective omniscient mind-style that is being represented within it. The reader is drawn further inside this sub-world through the second person technique where the indefinite pronoun '*you'* refers, as it were, to the speaking self and not to an external addressee as it is employed within a process of FID. Furthermore, the tense shift in this sub-world from the past to the present tense indicates a deictic alternation-*"is, do, think, takes, need, demands, are"*. Such tense manipulation is used to prime the sub-world and set it in a timeless realm to more vividly and powerfully express her convictions.

What makes this last sub-world stand out is that it contrasts, not just with the previous sub-world, but also with the following modal sub-world of perception triggered and hedged by the adverbial *'actually'*. In this following sub-world the use of pronouns and tenses are readjusted to their original forms; from 'you' to 'I', and from present to past tense. The mental projections in this sub-world can also be classified as FID as it offers a conscious reconstruction of her past; a personalized psychonarration of a previous event. This is affirmed by the switch to the past perfect tense in the final lines to indicate actions performed before another past event; to draw the readers back to the suicide. The tense shift to the past perfect here-*I'd swallowed, I'd managed, I'd been*-also indicates reference to a past event happening before another past one. This could

also be considered a type of attitudinal world switch, where the new space contains Self1's's evaluation of the situation.

1-2 Extract 2: "Diagnosis"

So these were the charges against me. I didn't read them until twenty-five years later. "A character disorder" is what they'd told me then… When I went to the corner bookstore to look up my diagnosis in the Manual, it occurred to me that I might not find it in there anymore…"Self-mutilating behavior (e.g., wrist-scratching)..." I've skipped forward a bit. This is the one that caught me by surprise as I sat on the floor of the bookstore reading my diagnosis. Wrist-scratching! I thought I'd invented it. Wrist banging, to be precise. I spent hours in my butterfly chair banging my wrist. I did it in the evenings, like homework. I'd do some homework, then I'd spend half an hour wrist-banging, then finish my homework, then back in the chair for some more banging before brushing my teeth and going to bed…

I was trying to explain my situation to myself. My situation was that I was in pain and nobody knew it,-even I had trouble knowing it. So I told myself, over and over, You are in pain. It was the only way I could get through to myself ("counteract feelings of `numbness'?). I was demonstrating, externally and irrefutably, an inward condition. (pp.152-153)

Context of extract:

After her discharge, Kaysen finally gets hold of copies of her McLean Hospital records which the institution was unwilling to release. She goes to a bookstore to

look up her BPD diagnosis in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. The records remind her of her past self (Self2) and what she went through during those difficult times. She responds to the report and "annotates" her diagnosis of BPD and the "charges against [her]". In this extract, Kaysen acknowledges that she had had a disturbed adolescence, but she initially attempts to refute some of the formal diagnosis of her condition. After questioning the certainty of her mental illness, she then mentions that she did in fact exhibit certain behaviors that could only have signaled "an inward condition" that is considered as evidence of mental illness. She had a habit of frequently and systematically banging her wrists against the hard metal folding frame of a butterfly chair. 'Ritual banging of the wrists' brought to the surface, or outwardly reflected some of the confusion and instability she felt within.

***Mind-style and split-self analysis**:*

Here again, as with the previous extract, the focalizer through whose perspective the text is being filtered seems to be the informed omniscient Self1. The past event being described in the extract is delivered to the reader via a detached narrative reporting (NR) of events and actions, i.e., through what is referred to by Fowler (1996) as internal type B narration, typical of Self1, where the focalizer appears to assume the position of an outside observer rather than an involved participator. This is most evident in the lines where she coldly lists the steps of her wrist banging ritual. The reader is again made to visualize the mental representations

of the events from the narrator's "floating overview". An analysis of the quoted extract also suggests that the mind-style of the focalizer is an intellectual, rational, and controlled one exhibited in the use of such definitive adverbs as "*externally and irrefutably*". Such a mind-set with its confident, declarative tone is normally associated with sanity and, therefore, with Self1.

Once more, in the last part of the extract, the cognitive tendency of Self1 to profile and appraise past incidents psychologically prevails endeavoring to determine the root cause of a past insane/psychotic behavior; wrist banging to "counteract feelings of numbness" and thus externalize "an inward condition". This section of the extract is also an additional explicit testimony of the narrator's split-self. The first person pronoun *"I"* and its reflexive equivalent *"myself"* seem to denote two separate entities, Self1 and Self2 respectively, with the focalizer envisioning a conversation between them. In this conversation, the attitude and words of the referent of *"I",* or of the composed rational Self1, betray an air of superiority as if it is patronizing troubled or unstable Self2 revealing reality to her. The statement "*even I had trouble knowing it"* clearly shows that the focalizer in this extract is astonished at the fact that even her wise omniscient *"I"* was even oblivious to that reality.

Text-world and sub-worlds analysis:

With the focalizer of this extract being Self1, the events are accordingly projected from her matrix Text-World1although the actual setting of the evolving

events is Self2's matrix Text-World2. Contrary to Extract 1, the specific text-world of Extract 2 is a forwarded projection into a future time—after discharge from the mental hospital. This flash-forward from the current time-zone of the memoir is signaled by the temporal coordinates *"until twenty-five years later"*. The spatial world-builder is the setting of the bookshop where she had gone to research her diagnosis.

This prolepsis is interrupted/infiltrated by the first sub-world triggered by the temporal adverb *"then"* meaning 'at that time', i.e., 25 years before the forward projection and back to the original time-zone of the memoir. This sub-world could be considered a deictic sub-world in the sense that it presents a shift in time and space of the main forwarded text-world. The shift in tense in this sub-world from the past simple to the past perfect-*they'd told*, *I thought I'd invented*-serves to further establish its embedded nature by expressing a series of past actions performed before the event at hand i.e., establishing it as part of the temporal time span referred to by *"then"*.

The last section of the extract constitutes another example of Self1's favored narrative technique of FID thick with psychonarration where the detached narrator exploits the first-person point of view to explore her subconscious psyche. This epistemic sub-world is built around her attempt to describe her own interior world. This last attempt is also why this sub-world can also be considered an attitudinal sub-world in that it accommodates Self1's evaluative comments. The tense shift from

the past to the past continuous that introduces this stretch of FID-"I was trying"-primes this sub-word. The progressive aspect employed implies a sense of duration giving the impression that Self1's trials to explain the situation to 'herself'/Self2, was no effortless process. This is reinforced by her using the expression "over and over". Whether those trials were conclusive in the sense that they resulted in a change of state, is not specified and left up to the reader to figure out. Generally speaking, the progressive aspect allows the reader an internal view of events of a happening which allows him to follow the particular events rather than capture an overall picture.

Finally, the second person technique is again used here but with a different aim than that in the previous extract. It is used here not to involve the reader, but to address 'herself' or Self2-*"You are in pain"*- to further prime the sub-world implying a narrated monologue or speech directed to oneself. Hence, the second person here reflects a counterpart of Self1, i.e., Self2. The candid conceptual deictic division of Self1 and Self2 in this extract, even though they are in fact one person, exhibits the prevalent sense of fragmented self-hood as suggested through co-referentiality-*'I'* and *'myself'*.

2- Extracts related to Self2

2-1 Extract 3: "Time"

We went over to see the dentist. His office was in the Administration Building, where long ago I'd sat quietly waiting to be locked up. The dentist was tall, sullen, and dirty, with speckles of blood on his lab coat and a pubic mustache. When he put his fingers

in my mouth they tasted of ear wax… "Lean back and count to ten," said the dentist. Before I got to four I was sitting up with a hole in my mouth.

"Where did it go?" I asked him. He held up my tooth, huge, bloody, spiked, and wrinkled.

But I'd been asking about the time. I was ahead of myself. He'd dropped me into the future, and I didn't know what had happened to the time in between. "How long did that take?" I asked. "Oh, nothing," he said. "In and out." That didn't help. "Like five seconds? Like two minutes?"

He moved away from the chair "Valerie," he called.

"I need to know," I said.

"No hot liquids for twenty-four hours," he said. "How long?" "Twenty-four hours."

Valerie came in, all business. "Up you get, let's go."

"I need to know how long that took," I said, "and he won't tell me."

She gave me one of her withering looks. "Not long, I can tell you that."

"It's my time!" I yelled. "It's my time and I need to know how much it was."

…In the cab Valerie said, "I've got something for you."

"I snitched it for you," she said. "Thanks, Valerie, that was nice of you." But the tooth wasn't what I really wanted. "I want to know how much time that was," I said. "See, Valerie, I've lost some time, and I need to know how much. I need to know."

Then I started crying. I didn't

want to, but I couldn't help it. (pp. 108-109).

Context of extract:

In a chapter called 'Dental Health', one of the lengthier and powerful vignettes in the book, Susanna is taken to Boston accompanied by the head nurse, Valerie, to have a wisdom tooth removed. Upon waking from this routine dental procedure, she demands to know how much time she was unconscious under anesthesia and becomes frantic when no one would tell her as she fears that she had lost time. Her state here rapidly escalates into a highly alarmed and frenzied one that was eventually pacified only through medication.

Mind-style and split-self analysis:

Self2's obsession with time becomes exceptionally evident in this episode. Finding it difficult to estimate time is one of Self2's most frustrating predicaments and thus one of the memoirs most notable themes. The whole memoir is, after all, one of an interrupted lifetime. As mentioned earlier in extract 1, time is described in the mental institution at the very beginning of the memoir as circular alongside a parallel universe where it is normally linear. She is acutely aware that she is living outside of regular time, marginalized. This awareness stimulated an obsession of the moment-to-moment passage of time in an attempt to exercise some kind of control over it.

Also as previously mentioned, a number of salient aspects of Self2's world view can be captured by the notion of a deviant mind-style, notably the sum of her anxieties,

fears and struggles. Her more restricted point of view showing an unorthodox conception of reality generates an overt presentation of Self2's cognitive state as she becomes the focalizer/reflector of the narration. In addition, the focalizer's communicative mode comes across to the reader as instinctive and impulsive rather than premeditated or narratorial. As a result of this, the reader is able to construct a representation of what appears to be a cognitively impaired mind-style caused by a genuine or an actual mental affliction.

One such struggle, the struggle with time, is perceived in this extract through the consciousness of Self2 whose mind-style cannot adequately fathom the passage of time and is fretful at the fact that she might have been deceived into losing more of it than she could grasp. Such a conclusion is reinforced by the fact that that was not the first incident where she becomes obsessed with time. In another incident she meticulously retraces her steps to figure out whether her interview with the doctor who first admitted her to the hospital lasted for twenty minutes as she remembers, or three hours as he claims. In addition, on the ward, time is marked by the constant "checks" made by nurses. She describes the five-minute, fifteen-minute, and half-hour checks as *"murdering time," "chopping off pieces of it and lobbing them into the dustbin."* It appears that the pain of time lost in captivity is unbearable to her.

In the case of Self2, such cognitive impairment revealing the nature of the girls' distorted conception and obsession of time

can be correlated to symptoms and characteristics associated with BPD. First, 'derealization', one of the main dissociative disorders of BPD, involves disruptions or breakdowns of perceptions involving distortions in perception of time. Clearly, the focalizer's mind-style in the above extract exhibits an obvious detachment or alienation from her surroundings along the dimension of time generally reflected in her persistent demand to be told the exact lapsed time. Second, of the psychotic-like symptoms exhibited in the extract that are associated with BPD is 'affective instability'. This consists of marked mood reactivity as irritability, anger, and impulsivity provoked by apprehension. Agitation about losing time is obvious in Self2's reaction as she repeatedly screams at the dentist: *"it's my time and I need to know how much it was! . . . I need to know"*, and as she continually and forcefully puts it to Valerie, *"I want to know how much time that was,"... "See, Valerie, I've lost some time, and I need to know how much. I need to know."*

Finally, distressing thoughts about being cheated out of time can also be traced back to one of the cognitive-perceptual symptoms of BPD, namely, 'paranoid ideation'-an exaggerated belief or delusions that one is being cheated or unfairly treated involving general suspiciousness about others' motives or intent. Self2 clearly states about the dentist that: *"He'd dropped me into the future, and I didn't know what had happened to the time in between"*, and that *"I need to know how long that took...and he won't tell me"* making evident her distrust of the dentist and his intentions. All this

serves to support the statement that the first person pronoun in this extract could only refer to Self2, constituting an internal type A narration in Fowler's (1996) terms, as it is she who is the disturbed unstable self that is vulnerable to such mania and inner turmoil.

Text-world and sub-worlds analysis:

Since the details of this incident are narrated by Self2 the matrix text-world in which it is situated is Self2's world of the insane. After setting the spatial coordinates of the specific text-world, the dentist's office, the focalizer takes the reader into an extended epistemic sub-world of FDD, as opposed to Self1's favored FID, using first-person narration in free direct mode (Leech & Short 2007) which serves to create a textual speech sub-world. In such a world, the reader's position shifts from the text-world occupied by the omniscient narrator to an epistemic modal-world containing this textual entity's idiosyncratic thoughts and distinctive perspectives. Such a transition is primed by the accompanying shifts in tense to the past perfect-*"I'd been asking*", *"He'd dropped me", "what had happened*" and the present-*"I need to know," "Up you get, let's go", "It's my time!", "I want to know*- to foreground the events described in the direct speech world against the background of the past narration. The present perfect serves to indicate the lost time before she had regained consciousness, and the present tense serves to capture the essence of the situation, evoke its urgency and call to mind its details. Consequently, an intimate and empathetic relationship is

established between the reader and the focalizer of the text.

Within this extended sub-world another embedded sub-world of a rather unique nature is triggered by the conjunction "but" denoting a contrast to the current context: "But I'd been asking about the time. I was ahead of myself. He'd dropped me into the future, and I didn't know what had happened to the time in between." This sub-world takes the reader one step back in the past before she posed the question "Where did it go?" – referring to time - i.e., before she became aware that a certain amount of time had passed and wanted to know exactly how much it was. It is as if this sub-world takes the reader into the temporal coordinates of her 'lost time'; the "time in between" before she had been "dropped into the future"; a world obscure to both the reader and Self2 who is not the omniscient narrator.

These lines read like 'interior monologue' where the inner voice of the focalizer mirrors her impressions and predicaments. The reader is able to follow the stream of Self2's consciousness via value-laden language expressing her attitude to what is being described or perceived, and as such is indicative of her mind-style. This is evident in her use of evaluative lexis when she describes the dentist as "tall, sullen, and dirty, with speckles of blood on his lab coat and a pubic mustache", and her removed tooth as "huge, bloody, spiked, and wrinkled". These value-laden statements can be considered as attitudinal sub-world in their selves as they denote that Self2 perceived that whole

situation as repulsive and intimidating. Such use of language is quite unlike the straight narrative reporting style of Self1.

2-2 Extract 4: "Bones"

I sat in my yellow vinyl chair not thinking about Torrey. I looked at my hand. It occurred to me that my Palm looked like a monkey's palm of the three Lines across it and the way my fingers curled in seemed simian to me. If I spread my fingers out, my hand looked more human, so I did that. But it was tiring holding my fingers apart. I let them relax, and then the monkey idea came back.

I turned my hand over quickly. The back of it wasn't much better. My veins bulged--maybe because it was such a hot day--and the skin around my knuckles was wrinkly and loose. If I moved my hand I could see the three long bones that stretched out from the wrist to the first joints of my fingers. Or perhaps those weren't bones but tendons? I poked one, it was resilient, so probably it was a tendon. Underneath, though, were bones. At least I hoped so. I poked deeper, to feel the bones.

They were hard to find. Knucklebones were easy, but I wanted to find the hand bones, the long ones going from my wrist to my fingers.

I started getting worried. Where were my bones? I put my hand in my mouth and bit it, to see if I crunched down on something hard. Everything slid away from me. There were nerves, there were blood vessels, there were tendons: All these things were slippery and elusive.

I began scratching at the back of my hand. My plan was to get hold of a flap of skin and peel it

away, just to have a look. I wanted to see that my hand was a normal human hand, with bones. My hand got red and white--sort of like Polly's hands--but I couldn't get my skin to open up and let me in.

I put my hand in my mouth and chomped. Success! A bubble of blood came out near my last knuckle, where my incisor had pierced the skin.

"What the fuck are you doing?" Georgina asked. "I'm trying to get to the bottom of this," I said. "Bottom of what?" Georgina looked angry. "My hand," I said, waving it around. A dribble of blood went down my wrist. "Well, stop it," she said. "It's my hand," I said.

Oh God, I thought, there aren't any bones in there, there's nothing in there. "Do I have any bones?" I asked them. "Do I have any bones? Do you think I have any bones?" I couldn't stop asking.

"Everybody has bones," said Polly. "But do I have any bones?"

"You've got them," said Georgina. Then she ran out of the room. She came back in half a minute with Valerie. "Look at her," Georgina said, pointing at me. Valerie looked at me and went away. "I just want to see them," I said. "I just have to be sure." "They're in there--I promise you," said Georgina. "I'm not safe," I said suddenly. Valerie was back, with a full medication cup. "Valerie, I'm not safe," I said… "It'll be okay, won't it?" I asked. My voice was far away from me and I hadn't said what I meant. What I meant was that now I was safe, now I was really crazy, and nobody could take me out of there. (pp.101-104).

Context of extract:

After Torrey, a patient with an amphetamine habit, was released into the custody of her neglectful parents, and after Daisy, a girl who is seasonally admitted to the hospital with an obsessive compulsive disorder, committed suicide, Kaysen becomes preoccupied with her hand and wonders whether it had any bones. She begins to scratch at her hand, trying to peel away the skin to examine its interior for bones. Georgina, a schizophrenic and Susanna's roommate at the institution, finds Valerie, the head nurse, who rushes in with Thorazine, a drug used to treat certain mental illnesses. As the drug takes effect, Kaysen takes comfort in the fact that she is finally evidently mentally ill and won't have to leave the hospital.

Mind-style and split-self analysis:

In a forthright exposition of a most disturbed mental state, Self2, the relator of the events, describes in this rather alarming section of the narrative a psychological disassociation with reality-a psychotic break- that yields her frenzied and petrified. Eventually, an anomalous relief overcomes her due to the recognition that she is in fact mentally ill; a relief no sane person would share with her. In recounting the incident with communicative discourse representative of a person actually undergoing such a psychotic break, it becomes apparent to the reader that it is Self2 who is the focalizer here. As a result, the reader utilizing information stored in mental representations created from both the text and general knowledge, comes to the conclusion that the referent of the first person pronoun here is Self2. The high frequency of the person

pronoun in its subjective, objective and possessive moods, "I" "me" and "my", (84 instances in all) in this extract, compared to other sections of the memoir, might reflect Self2's focus on herself and her relative alienation from others, which can be related to her mental disorder.

Like in the previous extract, this excerpt gives the reader access to Self2's mind-style through her narrative approach of internal type A narration. This hectic moment is described with brief, choppy sentences interspersed with a host of anxious questions that show Self2's state of mind and thought processes as she undergoes this physically and psychologically painful experience. The "graphic physicality" of this episode brings forth vividly to the reader's mind's eye the specifics of her delirious experience. The use of verbs of physical perception (e.g. "see", "look" and "feel") together with the abundance of adjectives denoting physical properties (e.g. "seminal", "wrinkly", loose", "resilient", slippery", and "elusive") serves to portray the focalizer's sensations and cognition.

This narration is also evidence of the focalizer's psychosis, or put more precisely, of what is referred to in mental illness as "depersonalization", a dissociative disorder of BPD patients marked by periods of feeling disconnected or detached from one's body. Accordingly, the primary symptom of depersonalization is a distorted perception of the body accompanied by intense anxiety. Generally speaking, depersonalization often occurs in response to experiencing a painful event and involves the mind automatically redirecting attention

away from that event. The mind's habit of blocking out intense painful emotions may provide temporary relief. Abandonment, in particular, is very a painful event for people with BPD patients whose efforts to avoid such pain may include fits of rage, and impulsive behaviors such as self-mutilation.

Self2 at first has no apparent reaction to Daisy's death, but after Torrey's release, she undergoes the above episode of depersonalization to counteract her feelings of abandonment developing a frantic obsession with the verification of her proposed fear that her hands might not have bones. Therefore, in the course of this extract, it becomes clear from the wording and representation of thought processes that the words represent the mind-style of a person detached from reality. For example, her addressing her skin as a separate entity from herself in: "*I couldn't get my skin to open up and let me in.*" shows clearly her detachment from her body. The substance of her thoughts and the distracted fashion in which she puts forward those thoughts are by no means those of a composed aware narrator. The words were those of a deranged person describing how she was looking for comfort or truth underneath her skin.

Text-world and sub-worlds analysis:

In this extract, the reader is most forcefully drawn into matrix text-world2 belonging to the mentally-ill Self2 who was trying to seek solace in her more manageable and less condemning parallel world of the insane by making sure that she had bones under her skin. The temporal coordinate of the specific text-world encompassing the extract is

the time after the departure of Daisy and Torrey, and the spacial coordinate is the ward's living room.

Presentation of the specific text-world is followed by a series of overlapping and intertwined sub-worlds comprising additional embedded sub-worlds. The first sub-world is an epistemic one that revolves around a notion that suggested itself to the focalizer and is prompted by the perceptual verb of cognition "occurred" in the phrase "It occurred to me that…" The sub-world is epistemic in the sense that its details belong to a virtual world experienced through the focalizer's senses whose actions determine what happens within it. This sub-world comprises a portrayal of Self2's impression that her hand resembled that of a nonhuman primate expressed by her words: "…my palm looked like a monkey's palm of the three lines across it and the way my fingers curled in seemed simian to me."

The second sub-world is a hypothetical world extended through the adverb of unassertiveness "perhaps" in the statement: "*Or perhaps those weren't bones…"* In this sub-world, Self2 is disassociated from the reality as her consciousness becomes fully consumed by her suspicion that her hands might be boneless. Embedded in this second sub-world is a boulomaic sub-world expressed by the verb "hope" in the expression: *"At least I hoped so"* stating her anticipation that there would hopefully be bones under the tendons. These three sub-worlds are remotely removed from the actuality of the

text-world and take place exclusively in the disturbed mind and consciousness of Self2 the focalizer even though their physical consequences have not yet become tangible.

These physical consequences are realized in the third sub-world where Self2 takes it upon herself to act upon her fixation of confirming the existence of bones in her monkey-like hands. This sub-world is also a boulomaic sub-world expressed here by the verb "want" in the statement: "…I wanted to find the hand bones…" and reiterated in the following statement "I wanted to see that my hand was a normal human hand, with bones." In this sub-world Self2 embarks on her dark trials to satisfy this desire by ripping open her skin till it bled. In the fourth and final sub-world in this extract, she explains her psychologically anguished and obsessive state yielding to her delusionary impulses. It is an epistemic sub-world triggered by the modal lexical "think" in the focalizer's declaration: " Oh God, I thought, there aren't any bones in there…" signaling that the whole sub-world, together with its following embedded sub-worlds, are consequences of a belief that took full possession of her consciousness.

Embedded within this final sub-world, same as in the previous extract, is an epistemic speech sub-world conveying Self2's dialogue with Georgina and Polly, two fellow patients, and Valerie the head nurse, following her attempt to mutilate her hand. What stands out in this conversation is the profusion of questions posed by Self2 to herself and to her interlocutors as in "Do I have any

bones?" I asked them. "Do I have any bones? Do you think I have any bones? But do I have any bones? ". These queries are all centered on the self as evident in the use of the first person "I". The rhetorical nature of these questions delineates her alarming thoughts and her dire need to find answers to these queries.

Finally, the tense shift to the present in the exchanges in this sub-world alters the time-frame of the text-world by inserting present tense utterances into a past tense narrative. Such a shift served to bring the reader more deeply and straightforwardly into Self2's world as the present tense projects the authenticity of the utterances in their actual timespan. This tense shift marks the speech's significance in relation to the unfolding and following events and evokes the scene more vividly in the reader's mind's eye.

Conclusion

In this paper it was proposed that the notions of split-selves and mind style could be used to capture different aspects of the narrative perspectives projected in distinct text-worlds. Text-world, split-self and mind-style theories were applied to the narrative in order to explain how, on a text-world-by-text-world basis, the focalizer changes so that in certain respects, another version of the narrating self is projected through a distinctive mind-style formed with every narrative world.

By repositioning readers among diverse text-worlds, selves, and mind-styles within the memoir, Kaysen was able to create a compelling narrative. This

technique is what renders the memoir complex, subtle and innovative, and may have led to the critical plaudits it has received. Such maneuvering by the author is also what renders the analysis interpretively revealing and highlights the structural complexity of this type of non-fiction prose. Everything in the narrative is related to her personal experiences: she is thus both the main character of her story (the experiencing self/Self2), and its narrator (the narrating self/Self1). As such we have ample access to her thoughts and attitudes both at the time of the events (narrative sequences/ matrix text-world2) and during the narrative process (metanarrative sequences/ matrix text-world1).

Put more precisely, the cognitive analysis of the memoir shows that even though it is narrated by a first person homodiegetic narrator, the focaliser of various vignettes of the memoir is not always a single entity; the reader is exposed to a double-vision of the writer, both as an adolescent BPD patient (the protagonist) and as a recovered adult (the narrator) with the different selves alternating in the role of focaliser. The text-world switches from adult Kaysen world (matrix text-world1) to adolescent Susanna parallel one (matrix text-world2) overlap throughout the narration creating a dual narrative consciousness in the memoir.

Accordingly, the split-self framework has been made more intricate by the fact that it was not only the author's self that was split, but also her world. These life/world splits reinforce the notion of the mind-style as it shows how the workings of the mind of a

focalizer are projected into a relative world. Therefore, the expression of psychological state, mind- style, is inextricably linked with particular mental perspectives in a certain text-world. This shows that a TWT approach can in fact contribute to a fuller understanding of complex styles of perspective presentation/focalization.

The analysis also shows that Kaysen's memoir can be praised particularly for providing a perceptive and realistic representation of the mind of a BPD patient through the discourse of someone who has recovered from this mental illness. By shifting the reader between the two worlds of the sane and the insane, Kaysen was able to convey different points of view via the subjective mind-styles of Self1, the sane omniscient narrator, and Self2, the mentally-ill patient. Kaysen was thus able to create a unique way of presenting character's thoughts by allowing the reader internal/external, reflector/narratorial binary viewpoints on the events while navigating in and out of the different corresponding text-worlds.

Accordingly, it can be concluded that salient and systematic patterns in a character's communicative behavior can often lead to inferences about the peculiar workings of that character's mind, especially when these behaviors can be interpreted as non-deliberate. In other words, a careful reading of Kaysen's memoir shows that the notion of mind-style is most apt to capture those aspects of world views that can indicate an abnormal mind-style due to genuine cognitive impairment.

This underlying double-layered structure of the narrative is therefore an amalgamation of more than one subjectivity, and, therefore, more than one narrator type. The narration exhibits degrees of development, ranging from elaborated analytical deliberation to spontaneous instinctive impression. In Kaysen's story we have such a figure of an independent and active "self" coexisting with the focalizer patient Susanna, shifting the narration simultaneously rather than alternatively between a focalized self and a focalizer one, each within her text-world. In other words, while patient Susanna's mind-style is responsible for her disassociations and fears, some analytical commentaries showing intellectual development are Susanna the narrator's responsibility.

This suggests that the concept of mind-style is highly relevant to the cognitive theory of text-worlds since it can capture the cumulative effect of consistent and idiosyncratic projection of split-self phenomenon throughout the text-worlds of the narrative. In *Girl, Interrupted*, text-worlds are transposed episodically as the narrative shifts regularly from the inner voice or thoughts of the enactor to the voice of the narrator and back again. In narrative theoretical terms, the text has a "variable focalization" according to the text-worlds domain encompassing the events. This also has implications for our understanding of how people read since "Different types of text may require different types of processing." (Semino, 2002).

In summary, the analysis has shed light on how the notions of

split-selves and mind-style as reflected in narratives demand the combination of information about the text-worlds of the narrated story and the nature of the narrative method. It also showed that the application of cognitive analysis in narrative, as the TWT approach, can be more gainfully conducted while drawing upon such notions. The insights from the concepts of split-selves mind-style revealed to be helpful in identifying movements between the two matrix text-worlds and their stemming sub-worlds irrespective of pronominal use given that the two selves alternate in the role of first-person raconteur of events. Moreover, the importance of drawing upon models of selfhood and cognitive processing in dealing with narratives containing more than one overarching text-world was pointed out.

Finally, there has been controversy about the possibility of FID in first person narration. Linguists who consider that FID is a category based on a set of formal criteria normally think that third person is one of its essential grammatical marks. However, FID was successfully employed by Kaysen here to make it possible for the speaker to move from one matrix text-world to another and from the perspective of one self to the other. It seems that a narrator telling about her own past life anchored her story on varying temporal planes, which means that she narrated the story at times as seen through the eyes of her former, younger self, and from her actual point of view at others. Examples from Kaysen's memoir show that FID is one of the means of keeping separate the different perspectives, that of the narrating

self and that of the acting or the remembering self.

Recommendations for Further Research

The field of cognitive stylistics is still very much in its formative years. It will yet strive to understand what happens in the mind of the reader when he or she interfaces with a literary text that has been designed thematically and stylistically to involve him or her. There remains, therefore, much work to be done in the area of cognitive stylistics, both in extending and operationalizing the theories involved and applying them to a range of text types which have interesting narrative structures. Like those analyses which have gone before it, this examination of the narrative structure of *Girl, Interrupted* is by no means exhaustive. More work is needed to provide unique insights into the complex conceptual processes involved in our understanding of memoirs as intriguing and often intense narrative experiences. It is hoped that this research will provide a point of departure for such future work.

Given that Self1's text-world does not consist of the same metaphors that are found in Self2's text-world, Cognitive Metaphor Theory may be applied to further show how idiosyncratic patterns of metaphor use can be exploited in a variety of ways by authors to convey a sense of the individual mind-style and cognitive habits of a particular character.

This examination also points out that the cognitive approach to the psychological facet of extended texts can be enriched by the implementation of the findings derived from narratology and the

area of psychology/psychiatry since the structure of mental processes can affect the structure of focalized narratives. Cognitive Psychology itself could play a decisive role in the study of focalization i.e., we could rely on the research done by psychologists to describe the psychological facet of point of view.

It is important to point out, in conclusion, that the present researcher is in no position to make strong claims about the cognitive reliability of TWT and the notions of split-selves and mind-styles. However, the three theories adopted have received support from empirical tests (see Eysenck and Keane 2000, Gibbs 1994 & Fauconnier 1997), and are compatible with current views on psychology and cognitive stylistics. Their main attraction for the purpose of this paper was that these theories have considerable explanatory power, and can be used to provide clear, systematic and cognitively plausible accounts of the linguistic construction of focalization in narrative fiction.

To end on a reflective note, Kaysen's memoir of self-reflection compels its reader to initiate his/her own journey of self-discovery. A controversial question that presents itself on reading this gripping narrative is whether it is because our dominant culture is one of singletons, i.e., those of us with a non-fragmented personality, that most 'multiple selves" have learned to conceal their multiplicity and impersonate persons with a single sense of self. Another troubling inquiry is whether our "moods" are simply a transient state or emotional quality, or manifestations of our

dormant "alter". Further, in failing to recognize such possibilities, are we doing ourselves justice, or are we causing it to approach that fine dividing line between Kaysen's worlds? Finally, could we all actually have two minds in our brains?

"There was no advantage in telling people. The longer I didn't say anything about it, the farther away it got, until the me who had been in the hospital was a tiny blur and the me who didn't talk about it was big and strong and busy."

Susanna Kaysen (1993)

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